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Highlights 
 New accountability mechanisms have been established in Russian hospitals.  
 The resulting governance structures create obstacles to effective mechanisms 
of accountability. . 
 Hospitals exhibit a leaky system of coordination, blocking horizontal 
information exchange. 
 There is little evidence of a learning culture to prevent repeating errors. 
 Including Russia in comparative research reveals different implementation 
patterns of New Public Management tools. 
 
Abstract  
This article examines the role of physicians within the managerial structure of Russian 
hospitals. A comparative qualitative methodology with a structured assessment 
framework is used to conduct case studies that allow for international comparison. The 
research is exploratory in nature and comprises 63 individual interviews and 49 focus 
groups with key informants in 15 hospitals, complemented by document analysis. The 
material was collected between February and April 2017 in five different regions of the 
Russian Federation. The results reveal three major problems of hospital management 
in the Russian Federation. First, hospitals exhibit a leaky system of coordination with 
a lack of structures for horizontal exchange of information within the hospitals (meso-
level). Second, at the macro-level, the governance system includes implementation 
gaps, lacking mechanisms for coordination between hospitals that may reinforce 
existing inequalities in service provision. Third, there is little evidence of a learning 
culture, and consequently, a risk that the same mistakes could be made repeatedly. 
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We argue for a new approach to governing hospitals that can guide implementation of 
structures and processes that allow systematic and coherent coordination within and 
among Russian hospitals, based on modern approaches to accountability and 
organisational learning. 
 
Keywords 
Hospital governance; clinical management; medical leadership; coordination of 
accountability mechanisms; comparison; Russia 
 
Background 
This article seeks to understand the role of the physician within the overall managerial 
structure of Russian hospitals. The clinical encounter between the physician and the 
patient is at the heart of the hospital yet, with the increasing complexity of healthcare, 
it will only be effective if the work of the hospital is well-managed, so that all the 
elements necessary to deliver care, such as appropriately trained health professionals 
and specialised facilities and equipment, come together in the right place at the right 
time. This will only happen if there are appropriate systems of governance in place, 
enabling those in managerial and clinical roles to work together for the common good, 
balancing accountability upwards with delegation of decision-making downwards. 
Developing and implementing these systems is always difficult, especially in a country 
such as the Russian Federation, which has a tradition of rigid hierarchical 
management structures in many sectors.  
In this article we describe the role of physicians in Russian hospitals and, especially, 
those occupying managerial roles. We ask whether the structures and processes that 
are in place are able to promote high quality, appropriate, and cost-effective care. In 
interpreting our findings, we draw on four bodies of literature. 
The first relates to governance of health systems. Thus, one analysis, drawing on case 
studies from different parts of health systems, argues that good governance is 
characterised by what it terms TAPIC, or Transparency, Accountability, Participation, 
Integrity, and policy Capacity.1,2 Each is important and interlinked. Thus, accountability 
without transparency means that those reporting what they are doing may not know 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
4 
 
why they are doing so, and thus what is important. Accountability without participation, 
for example to agree goals, can lead to gaming and other forms of opportunistic 
behaviour. Integrity includes hiring and promotion on grounds of merit, which is more 
likely where there is transparency. Capacity relates to the ability to take evidence-
based decisions, which is aided by participation by those who best understand the 
problem. The major benefit of this approach is its focus on interlinked governance 
outcomes, which makes it possible to move beyond the narrower concept of 
organisational management. 
A second body of literature comes from clinical management research, exploring the 
relationship between clinicians and managers, and especially clinician managers, 
including the extent to which different groups assume positions of leadership and 
coordinate the work of those involved in delivering care, while placing these roles and 
relationships within a wider health system context.3-10 This literature has highlighted 
the importance of emergent connections between hospital governance and clinical 
management and different levels of decision-making.11 Thus, Denis and van Gestel, 
drawing on Canadian and Dutch data, highlight the ways in which characteristics of 
health systems influence the potential for alignment between soft (trust, collaboration) 
and hard (financial incentives) levers, ideally combining clarity and stability of policy 
with openness to local experimentation.5 Duran and Saltman describe important 
transformations in decision-making that flow from new governance paradigms.11 They 
highlight how new forms of interaction between different levels of public hospital 
governance ‘create networks of actors, rather than according to the old model of 
explicit relationships of decision-makers and decision-takers. … authority cannot be 
exerted anymore the way it used to be in the past’. 11 The authors identify many 
reasons why ‘publicly operated hospitals need to pursue their objectives free from the 
influence of monolithic, command-and-control models’,11 a particular challenge in all 
former Soviet countries.12,13  
A third body of work, which also applies a health system and multi-level governance 
approach, looks in more detail at governance arrangements within hospitals. Thus, 
[names withheld for anonymity of submission] developed an assessment instrument 
and used it to examine hospital governance and management in seven western 
European countries, taking different levels, structures and actors into account.14 They 
identified three emerging patterns: integrated control and coherent coordination; partly 
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integrated control with diversity of coordination and some fragmentation of cost and 
quality controls; and fragmented control with uneven and limited coordination, with a 
gap between quality, controlled by medicine, and cost control, by management.9 This 
study concluded that, while there may be different organisational structures, what is 
important is that structures and functions are coordinated. It also highlighted the need 
for a shift in engagement of the medical profession with management, with 
management increasingly ‘internalised in the minds of doctors’. 9  
A comparative study in OECD countries confirms increasing involvement of doctors in 
management, linking this to quality improvement.15 Yet, despite some evidence of the 
benefits of medical leadership,16 caution is needed because quality depends on many 
different factors.10,17 A Dutch study, for instance, reports an overall weak correlation 
between quality orientation of managers and hospital governance, 18 with no clear 
linear relationship between quality orientation and hospital performance identifiable.18 
Similarly, Jeurissen et al. argued that new hospital policies and management models 
will likely fall short in delivering better quality of care and lower growth in health 
expenditure.3 These authors reminded us of the many and complex reasons why 
success is often elusive, which span from protecting interests of the hospitals to 
various forms of technical difficulties in handling new tools.3 
A fourth body of work on hospital governance deepens the analysis on the micro-level 
and examines the decisions that managers and clinicians make. This can involve 
direct observation (participant or non-participant), seeking to understand the workings 
of the complex relationships between managers and clinicians,8,19 and the extent to 
which governance arrangements support their functioning. One important finding is 
that organisational structures often fail to support new tasks of doctors adequately. 
This not only reduces the efficiency of the organisation but causes stress for the 
individual doctor.20 Other findings from Nordic countries highlight the capacity of 
professionals to drive innovation and the importance of ‘participation’ in the 
transformation processes,4,21,22 which was more generally identified as a key 
dimension of ‘good governance’.2 However, the focus on micro-level processes 
reduces the opportunities offered by cross-country comparison and knowledge 
translation. We do not know which of the many possible factors facilitate (or block) 
innovation and at what level of governance; these limitations are apparent in several 
studies seeking to link quality-related outcomes to governance changes.3,18 
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The research that has been undertaken so far has been concentrated in the European 
Union (EU) member states and English speaking high-income countries elsewhere. 
There has been little such research in low and middle-income countries,23-25 with none, 
to our knowledge, in the Russian Federation. Yet a detailed understanding of how 
Russian hospitals operate is important for various reasons. Firstly, from an 
international perspective, hospitals in the Russian Federation offer a different type of 
institutional setting and hospital management model, which may help to better 
understand issues of convergence and context-dependency in hospital governance 
and clinical management.  
Secondly, reflecting the Russian Federation’s very high burden of disease, including 
high levels of mortality amenable to healthcare,26 the Russian government has placed 
a high priority on addressing this issue. Long term underinvestment in facilities, 
equipment and people, meant that although the Soviet system it inherited provided 
basic coverage to a widely dispersed population, the quality of care was often poor.23 
In 1993, the Russian health system underwent radical reform, with introduction of a 
mandatory health insurance system, using a national model but organised regionally. 
This has allowed for diversity in the way the health system is configured in different 
parts of the country. From 2005, the Russian government has developed a series of 
initiatives, including a major federal investment programme, which includes substantial 
investment in new equipment.27 However, for this programme and related efforts to 
achieve their full potential, there is a need for a good understanding of the structures 
and functions involved in governance of hospitals that benefited from this investment. 
This paper begins the process of providing this understanding.  
Key research questions/objectives 
1) to understand the governance structures in clinical management in the Russian 
Federation and the mechanisms in place to ensure accountability for financial 
decisions and efficiency, for quality and safety, and for upholding professional 
standards; 
2) to identify any gaps in the governance structure and any mechanisms that may 
weaken coordination, thus impacting negatively in the efficiency of hospitals 
and quality of care; 
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3) to examine the Russian model of clinical management in comparative 
perspective, identify convergence and/or divergence, and explore how these 
findings add to the international debate. 
 
Methods 
The focus of the study is on public hospitals in the Russian Federation, which provide 
almost all inpatient care in the country.24,28 A glossary of specific Russian terms is in 
Box 1. Country case studies apply a comparative qualitative methodology allowing for 
international comparison.29,30 The research is exploratory in nature and comprises 
interviews with key informants in 15 hospitals, complemented by document analysis 
and review of secondary sources. The material was collected between February and 
April 2017 in five of the 85 regions of the Russian Federation, in four of the seven 
Federal Districts, namely the Volga, North-West, Ural and Central Federal Districts. 
Details of the numbers of individuals interviewed are given in Table 1. 
 
Research design and sampling 
The research design is theoretically informed by governance theory2 and 
methodologically informed by the Hospital Control Assessment Framework (HCAF),14 
a tool which was developed and validated in a EU comparative study9 as part of the 
FP7 COST action on medicine and management.7 More specifically, the benefit of this 
assessment framework is that clinical management is placed in a health system 
context to systematically connect different levels of governance and institutional 
structures and actors. The instrument focuses on the organisational level, comprising 
four major dimensions of governance and accountability mechanisms (for details, see 
supplement Table 1):  
 governance structures within the hospital; 
 mechanisms to ensure accountability for financial decisions; 
 mechanisms to ensure accountability for quality and safety; 
 mechanisms to ensure professional medical standards. 
The instrument was adapted to the Russian context by the Russian and international 
team members in an interactive one-day workshop in Moscow in the autumn of 2016. 
The team discussed in-depth the qualitative methodology and whether and how the 
main indicators apply to hospital governance in the Russian Federation. Specific 
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attention was paid to semantic and definitional issues and the translation of key terms. 
It was decided that the four main categories of the assessment tool were sufficiently 
generic to be applied to the Russian context. The relatively high degree of 
standardisation of the tool was perceived as a benefit because it enables both 
international comparison, and the gathering of qualitative material in different regions 
and by different researchers. The focus on structures and tools and the definition of 
groups of actors (e.g. junior doctors, chief executives) is a further benefit of the 
assessment tool. This allowed us to assess hospital governance in different 
organisational contexts but without gathering in-depth micro-level data, which would 
not have been possible, given the available resources and geographical conditions. 
On this basis, the research design of the present study was specified. 
In a country as vast as the Russian Federation, with such diverse geographic and 
economic characteristics, it is not possible to identify a truly representative sample of 
hospitals. Consequently, our approach to sampling was purposive, seeking to include 
regions from across the Russian Federation that have different levels of population 
size and economic development (Table 2). Thus, our sample covered almost the entire 
spectrum of economic development (with those selected ranged from 6th to 75th out of 
85 in order of Gross Regional Product). However, we also took account of practical 
travel considerations, thus excluding Siberia and the Far East. Within each region we 
sampled different types of hospitals. 
The hospital system in Russian regions is organised hierarchically. Regional (oblast) 
hospitals for adults (typically 500–1000 beds) and children (typically 300–600 beds) 
provide a full range of clinical specialties and act as referral centres for general 
hospitals within the region. They are usually the setting for clinical teaching by the 
regional medical school. City hospitals typically have 150–800 beds (adults) or 100–
300 beds (children). They provide a more limited range of clinical specialties. There 
may also be specialised hospitals for infectious and psychiatric conditions. Finally, 
there are district (rayon) hospitals, with 100–300 beds, offering basic inpatient and 
outpatient care in internal medicine, surgery, and obstetrics and gynaecology.24  
We selected three hospitals per region. These were the regional hospital, the city 
hospital also located in the regional capital, and a district hospital some distance away 
from the capital that was identified in consultation with the regional health ministry; the 
final selection was based on the willingness of the hospital management to participate 
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in the study. Within the hospitals we focused on those managing patients with 
cardiovascular diseases, because care for patients with cardiovascular disease (CVD) 
is firstly, of very high relevance for the healthcare system and secondly, it is defined 
by comprehensive guidelines, which facilitate comparison of clinical management 
across hospitals and regions and on international level.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
In each hospital, structured interviews were conducted with key informants by the 
Russian research team, comprising three researchers, either as an individual interview 
or in focus groups. The topic guide for the interviews followed the categories described 
in the assessment framework, which made it possible to use broadly similar generic 
questions for different types of interviews and groups (for details, see supplement topic 
guide). The individual interviews included the chief physician, and several deputy chief 
physicians. The focus groups were recruited from among the medical staff in each 
hospital. They were convenience samples, reflecting the availability of staff at the time 
of the visit, but also following the same procedure for different departments. Each 
focus group included the head of a department and a range of senior and junior 
medical staff of the same department. The interviewees and the participants of the 
focus-groups were treated as key informants, providing insights into the governance 
of the particular hospital. The combination of individual interviews and focus groups 
made it possible to critically review the information in relation to individual perceptions 
and interactions in the group.  
Altogether 63 individual interviews and 49 focus groups with 282 participants were 
conducted in the 15 hospitals in five regions. The results from the interviews and  focus 
groups were triangulated and written up by the researchers in note form in Russian 
and used to complete a proforma for each hospital, adapted from the Hospital Control 
Assessment Framework (HCAF).14 This information was supplemented with 
information from documentary sources where relevant. The completed proformas 
were translated into English (initially using Google Translate, with subsequent revision 
by a native Russian speaker). Additional field notes were prepared for each hospital. 
Information from key informants was documented in Russian.  
Prior to each interview and focus group, oral voluntary informed consent was obtained: 
the subjects of the study were informed of the objectives, methods, any possible 
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conflicts of interest, expected results, potential risks and any other significant aspects 
of the study. They then agreed to the use of the data obtained for research purposes. 
Before the beginning of the interview or the focus-group, the participants were notified 
of the use of information received during the interview or focus group without indicating 
the identity and details of the organisation. 
The information from the interviews was extracted and mapped onto the elements of 
the assessment framework (comprising structure and action dimensions and different 
levels of governance)14 resolving any contradictions or ambiguities by reference to 
other interviews and documents. This was done by the Russian team, and 
subsequently by the Russian and international teams at a second workshop in July 
2017 in Moscow (lasting 1.5 days, and including 6-8 core members – the Russian and 
international project leaders and researchers – and a few other experts. Language 
translation was an important issue; major terms were translated back and forth to 
ensure international comparability.  
 
Results 
Governance structures within the hospital 
Historically, hospitals in Russia were subordinate to the corresponding tier of 
government, at the federal, oblast, city and rayon levels. This has given way to a 
process of centralisation within the oblast, with the vast majority of hospitals 
subordinate to the oblast Ministry of Health. The oblast ministry is accountable to the 
elected oblast governor, although operating within a legal and regulatory framework 
developed by the federal ministry. We did, however, find a few exceptions, as in 
Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, and Nizhny Novgorod, where some city hospitals 
remain subordinate to the municipal authorities. Within the hospital, the list of 
managerial positions, reflecting the hierarchical governance structure, is defined in a 
decree by the federal health ministry, most recently updated in 2012, although this 
decree only covers managers with a medical qualification. Nevertheless, the 
dominance of physicians in management means that the overall managerial structures 
are fairly homogenous at all levels of the system.  
Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical governance structure and accountability 
arrangements in hospitals in the Russian Federation. Executive power rests with the 
hospital’s chief physician, who is accountable only to the regional Minister of Health. 
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The chief physician must, obviously, be medically qualified, and have completed her 
or his professional training in a medical specialty, be certified in healthcare 
organisation or healthcare management, and have occupied a senior position for at 
least five years.  
The chief physician has considerable autonomy in deciding how the hospital is 
organised and managed, including internal governance structures, and employment. 
Although he or she is subject ultimately to the regional Minister and within a detailed 
legal framework, there is little regular interaction between them. There is no 
requirement to go through a specified set of procedures to employ or dismiss a 
member of staff. This gives the chief physicians great power of patronage in their 
hospitals.  
The next tier of management comprises a variable number of deputies to the chief 
physician (the senior management team). The relationship of this tier to the chief 
physician is strictly hierarchical. The deputies can give advice but there is no tradition 
of shared decision-making or corporate management. In virtually all cases, they are 
clinicians. The deputy responsible for medical care is typically a physician who 
commands the respect of their colleagues. The individual responsible for finances is 
often someone with a medical qualification but some additional training in accounting. 
Professional managers and those with specialised expertise in, for example, human 
resources or information technology are effectively absent at this level. Their roles are 
assumed by the physicians responsible for different services and departments. This 
gives them little opportunity to acquire the specialised knowledge required in these 
areas, while also creating considerable duplication. Junior physicians have no input 
into managerial decisions but are required to report upwards on their activities. 
Table 3 provides an overview of the average number of staff in senior and middle 
management in different types of hospitals. Their numbers vary, with some having ten 
or more deputies at this level. In recent years, the number of deputies has tended to 
increase, sometimes reflecting an increase in the scope of activities of the hospital, 
but also because creating deputies provides an opportunity for the chief physician to 
bestow patronage.  
The most senior nurse in the hospital is typically subordinate to the chief physician. 
This nurse may be in the first tier, with the deputy chief physicians, but is sometimes 
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at the next tier down. Other professional groups with mid-level qualifications, such as 
psychologists, technicians, laboratory scientists, or midwives for example, have 
relatively low status. In contrast to many other countries, these health workers lack full 
recognition as professionals and have no self-governing powers. Only two of the 15 
hospitals in the sample had an individual in the second management tier who oversaw 
the management of facilities and nonclinical services and who was not qualified in 
medicine or nursing. Only four of 15 hospitals had any plans for organisational reform 
that would have addressed these issues.  
The hierarchical arrangements continue at lower levels. Hospital staff work mostly in 
a series of silos, related to the setting of care, be it inpatient, outpatient, or a specialty. 
Some hospitals do, however, have hospital-wide structures relevant to quality of care, 
including committees on blood safety, hospital formularies (established in 7 out of 15 
hospitals), and patient complaints (established in 12 out of 15). These committees are 
usually chaired by a deputy chief physician. Otherwise, any horizontal communication 
is informal.  
The hierarchical structures are based on a system of command and control, with 
instructions issued from above and penalties for failure to comply. In most of the 
hospitals, we identified a blame culture, whereby those lower in the hierarchy were 
punished for any failings as individuals. In only three of the hospitals did we find any 
system to identify structural reasons for failings, such as system or root cause 
analyses.  
 
Financial accountability mechanisms 
Hospitals are primarily (80%-97%) funded by the territorial mandatory health insurance 
funds, which covers the entire population except for the military, police, and some 
similar groups. The traditional historical budgets based on bed numbers have given 
way to activity-based formulae, although the basis of payment is an episode of 
completed treatment, defined using Diagnosis Related Groups or clinical profile 
groups. Physicians, like other health workers, are paid salaries. A financial activity plan 
is developed for the whole hospital and communicated to the units (or departments), 
linked to targets that form the basis of a control system. There is little evidence of 
financial systems that would facilitate budgetary discretion at lower levels.  
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Some signs of change can, however, be seen. Pay-for-performance schemes have 
been established in all hospitals since 2008, based mainly on group outcomes. 
Indicators vary among hospitals but mostly involve administrative and technical 
measurements, for instance, ‘performance according to job descriptions’, ‘absence of 
complaints and/or sanctions by state regulatory bodies and insurance companies’, or 
‘absence of patient complaints’. Eight of the 15 hospitals use additional indicators 
related to medical outcomes, for instance ‘hospital re-admission within 90 days’ and 
‘complication rates and non-compliance with medical standards’. However, decision-
making is embedded in the hierarchical governance structure so, ultimately, final 
decisions are based on the discretion of the top level of hospital management.  
 
Quality and safety mechanisms 
Russian legislation requires establishment of an internal system of quality and safety 
control of medical activities, as a condition of licensing.31 This serves as an important 
control mechanism in all hospitals, yet the actual procedures may vary as 
implementation is under the authority of the individual chief physician. However, 
individual leadership practices are only one reason for this variety. Most importantly, 
our findings reveal structural differences in the three types of hospitals: the rayon 
hospitals all lacked any internal system for quality assurance and patient safety, while 
both the city and the oblast hospitals had taken at least some action. These systems 
seem to be most advanced in the oblast and city hospitals in Tatarstan. 
Some structural similarities can be identified among the hospitals that have introduced 
quality assurance mechanisms. Set within the hierarchical system of management, 
their operation is based on upward accountability, from a departmental medical 
committee, which undertakes the main investigation of medical errors and monitors 
outcomes of treatment, to a deputy chief physician and, ultimately, the chief physician. 
However, we found no evidence of systematic mechanisms to enable the flow of 
information, for example on lessons learned, in the opposite direction.  
A further problem relates to the concept of 'medical error', which is not conceptualised 
as a potential trigger for changes to practice or policy or a learning opportunity but 
rather as a potentially criminal act, with sections of the Russian Criminal Code referring 
to causing death by negligence (Article 109), causing severe or moderate severity of 
injury through negligence (Article 118), and refusal to help the patient (Article 124).32  
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We found little evidence of the various approaches developed within the framework of 
new public management that have been introduced elsewhere in recent years to 
improve quality of care and safety of patients,33 such as those involving systematic 
approaches to monitoring problems to identify issues of concern or to exchange 
information beyond the individual hospital. Modern performance management 
procedures were generally lacking. The illustrative examples below reveal 
considerable variation: 
 Although a quality management system has been designed, described in State 
Standard ISO 9001-2015 (Quality management systems. Requirements), it had 
only been implemented successfully in two of the 15 hospitals. 
 Most of the hospitals studied had no comprehensive system to audit medical 
performance. Only four conducted audits on a regular basis (once or twice a 
year), and only two of these systems were ISO accredited.  
 Only one third of the hospitals reported undertaking questionnaire-based 
patient surveys to inform the quality of medical care. Those that did had 
examined patient satisfaction with the quality of treatment and nutrition, 
compliance of medical staff with ethical standards, evidence of corruption in the 
hospital, and out-of-pocket payment, especially for drugs. 
 All hospitals prepared reports on the quality of medical care either annually or 
quarterly but we were unable to identify consistent definitions of quality 
indicators beyond the dominant focus on crude mortality rates. 
 Clinical guidelines developed on the federal level for the national health system 
were used systematically in only four of our 15 hospitals, none of which were 
the rayon hospitals. These hospitals had established clear lines of 
responsibility; the deputy physician-in-chief (for organisational and 
methodological procedures) was accountable for updating databases on clinical 
guidelines and ensuring that they were communicated to staff. While other 
hospitals had guidelines, most used them in a purely formulaic, bureaucratic 
manner to show that they were complying with state supervision by the Federal 
Service for Supervision of Healthcare and inspections by health insurance 
companies. 
 
Ensuring professional medical standards 
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In 2013, a reform of postgraduate medical education began. It is currently transitioning 
to a system involving traditional educational courses attended once in five years to 
one of continuing medical education (CME). The transition period will end in 2021 but 
several approaches now exist in parallel and many aspects of postgraduate education 
are yet to be defined in official documents. While the physician is expected to engage 
in CME on a continuing basis, this will feed into a new re-accreditation procedure, 
which will also take place every five years. Current proposals envisage a requirement 
that each doctor must earn a minimum of 50 educational credits for participation in 
training events and electronic training modules in each calendar year; the certificates 
will eventually be registered in their personal online account. However, almost all of 
the key informants reported technical difficulties when registering a personal account 
on the website of the Coordinating Council for the Development of Continuing Medical 
and Pharmaceutical Education, although this may reflect a lack of familiarity with 
computers among older physicians. Only four of the hospitals provided support; they 
had created a centralised system for registering activity within their human resources 
departments.  
Other forms of ensuring professional standards include more traditional models like 
clinical conferences, which were widely used. Mentoring programmes were also 
available in about 80 per cent of the hospitals, yet only one third used these 
opportunities systematically. 
The small rayon hospitals, with fewest resources, and staff shortages faced the most 
serious challenges in offering appropriate training and professional development. 
Their doctors had only limited opportunities for professional development (mainly 
distance learning, which takes the form of live webinars and online modules). Another 
problem is the lack of incentives for hospitals to support professional development, as 
none of the performance-based indicators include the acquisition of competences by 
staff and participation in professional development. 
 
Discussion 
The governance structure in the hospitals of the Russian Federation is characterised 
by a rigid hierarchy, dominated by the medical profession. The Federal Ministry of 
Health defines the legal framework, including financial rules (subject to some potential 
modifications at oblast level), within which the hospital operates, while executive 
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power is highly personalised and linked to the chief physician and deputies at lower 
tiers of management (Figure 1). This system is essentially the same as that inherited 
from the Soviet period. It remained largely untouched during the transition period from 
a planned economy to the market, in part because, during the significant reduction in 
state funding of medical organisations, it preserved a degree of stability and enabled 
effective mobilisation of internal resources. However, in the period since the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, this management structure acted as a brake on measures to 
improve hospital efficiency, now urgently needed to address longstanding problems, 
including growing imbalances in the medical workforce.34 
More nuanced mechanisms to ensure accountability have been introduced recently as 
a result of new public management reforms,35 including pay-for-performance 
schemes, based on objective measures, and mechanisms to improve quality and 
safety, such as mandatory continuing medical education. Superficially, these 
innovations look familiar to those in other industrialised countries.7,11,13 However, 
important differences exist, with many problems embedded in processes of 
implementation that constrain the potentially transformative effects of reform policies, 
thereby limiting accountability in clinical management.  
 
Gaps in the governance structure: coordination and integration matter 
In our analysis, we found that the day-to-day operation of mechanisms to assure 
quality and safety was decentralised to departmental committees. While there are 
vertical lines of accountability, we found little evidence of horizontal coordination or 
sharing of information. This may seem surprising given the overall hierarchical 
approach to hospital governance in Russia. This has implications for the operation of 
the system, given how approaches to quality and the tools available are changing 
rapidly. However, we found several important gaps in the governance structure and 
corresponding mechanisms. Such gaps may weaken coordination, as shown in the 
international literature,9 thus impacting negatively on the efficiency of hospitals and 
quality of care.3,18 It is important to recall the importance of coordination as one of the 
five key dimension of governance2. 
The most serious gap exists between the hierarchical, personalised structure of clinical 
management and what is needed to implement reform policies that introduce complex 
modes of governing. The new, more transparent accountability mechanisms seek to 
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change the strongly person-centred executive powers of the chief physician. Yet these 
do not sit easily with the old structure. As a consequence, implementation is at the 
discretion of the chief physician (or subordinate management tiers) and the 
transformative potential may be blocked if it is seen as a threat to the traditional 
hierarchy. 
This tension is shaping the development and implementation of these new 
accountability mechanisms, both in respect of financial flows and quality and safety; it 
also constrains professional development, especially in smaller, resource-poor 
hospitals. One important problem arising from this structural conservatism is the 
seeming inability to develop horizontal coordination of measures relating to quality and 
safety, compounded by the absence of bottom-up participatory governance processes 
feeding into the top level. These conditions lead to limited managerial transparency 
and embody the risks of patronage, nepotism and corruption.36  
A major barrier to effective management is the absence of any mechanisms to link the 
allocation of resources to clinical activity, which may create a lack of transparency of 
governance.2 For example, it was not clear how one would recruit new staff or redeploy 
existing ones to establish a new model of care.  
A further problem is the weakness of systems to monitor outcomes and the absence 
of any system accountability to public decision-making bodies. This means that no 
conclusions can be drawn on the effectiveness of the financial indicators linked to 
individual pay-for-performance. This example illustrates our previous argument that 
the new managerial tools may look similar across countries, but their impact is different 
and effectiveness is diminishing when implemented in hospital structure of the Russian 
Federation. 
This ‘implementation dilemma’ of new management tools and complexity of 
circumstances is even more obvious in relation to quality and safety mechanisms.3,18 
The findings reveal that only a minority of hospitals has implemented these tools. 
Thus, there is considerable variety. Most importantly, organisational failure to respond 
to health policy goals is neither monitored nor subjected to sanctions. Moreover, we 
found no evidence of mechanisms to respond to failure of implementation or to 
develop stronger frameworks for implementation and monitoring. 
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Another important problem is lack of participation and integration, which were also 
identified as key dimensions of governance.2 The ‘series of silos’ in hierarchical 
management structures mean that there is little coordination between the levels and 
tasks of management. Such arrangements are particularly challenging given the 
changing demands on healthcare, characterised, on the one hand, by patients with 
multi-morbidity, and on the other hand by growing evidence for the benefits of 
multidisciplinary working, skills mixes and team approaches.37,38 While theoretically 
possible for these new models of care to be adopted, proposals from those on the 
front line must be taken up through the hierarchy until they reach a point at which the 
silos join.  
This is also one of the main stumbling blocks for innovation in the system; proposals 
need to overcome many hurdles within the system and are rarely encouraged. Added 
to this, procedures to evaluate patient satisfaction and ensure feedback are poorly 
developed or broadly neglected. Considerable efforts have been made to evaluate 
patient satisfaction in recent years. However only a third of the hospitals surveyed 
undertook any activity systematically to improve the quality of medical care. This 
underlines what has been reported from elsewhere in the system, namely, that patient 
involvement and patient rights often remain tokenistic.24 
 
Clinical management: are hospitals prepared for new demands?  
So, how well is clinical management in the Russian Federation prepared to respond 
to new demands for control and managing more integrated service delivery for 
chronically ill patients, especially those suffering from multi-morbidity? Our research 
reveals that hospitals are poorly prepared. Clinical management is especially weak in 
respect of actor-centred and participatory governance, thus neglecting the contribution 
that frontline health professionals, supported by shared leadership, can make to 
innovation.4,5,21,22  
The most urgent task is to overcome the structural conservatism of hospital 
governance and develop models of coordination that balance accountability upwards 
with delegation of decision-making downwards. This also includes ‘new forms of 
interaction’ and the creation of ‘networks of actors’, as explained in the international 
literature.11 These changes could improve implementation of clinical management and 
strengthen the transformative capacity of the health professions.  
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Our results illustrate that the five major principles of ‘good governance’ described 
previously with reference to a framework developed by a team of the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies2 may help to identify policy weaknesses 
and also serve as pointer to the major policy levers: 
 improve participation and integration of professionals and patients,  
 improve transparency of control mechanisms, 
 establish more complex mechanisms of accountability and professional 
development, 
 strengthen mechanisms to detect malpractice and improve integrity, 
 build capacity of a wider range of professionals and involving patients to support 
coordination and integration in clinical management. 
However, these measures may require a reassessment of the roles being undertaken. 
This analysis raises particular questions about the roles of many of the deputy chief 
physicians, especially where they have responsibilities for administrative areas. There 
seems no good reason why these roles should be occupied by physicians and, indeed, 
would likely be performed better by individuals with high levels of training on the issues 
concerned, such as human resources or facilities management.  
 
Clinical management through the comparative looking glass: is there 
international convergence? 
This assessment of clinical management in the Russian Federation makes it possible 
to review the findings in an international comparative perspective. This is useful 
because the study confronts the debate about convergence or divergence of health 
systems and ‘hybridisation’ of clinical management with the empirical realities of 
transformation countries.  
A comparative perspective reveals different things. In relation to policy 
recommendations, comparison works like a magnifying glass. It makes the ‘blind 
spots’ of hospital governance in the Russian Federation visible, and therefore enables 
a gap analysis and identification of major policy levers for change, namely closing the 
gaps in both horizontal and vertical coordination structures and mechanisms. In 
relation to an international scholarly debate, our findings confirm robustness of the 
assessment framework used in a non-EU context as well as the importance of 
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‘coordination’ as both an important dimension of governance2 and a generic category 
to better understand how to make change happen in clinical management.9  
Previous research in EU countries identified three models of clinical management. 
These are: a) integrated’ control with high levels of coordination and coherent patterns 
for cost and quality controls; b) ‘partly integrated’ control with diversity of coordination 
on hospital and department level and between cost and quality controls; and c) 
‘fragmented’ control with limited coordination and gaps between quality control more 
strongly dominated by medicine, and cost control by management. However, the 
Russian model that we observed does not fit easily with any of these. Instead we have 
coined the term ‘leaky’ coordination. This is because the management structures are, 
at least formally, structured on a strict hierarchical model, with instructions descending 
from the top. This lacks mechanisms of coordination that balance accountability 
upwards with delegation of decision-making downwards. In practice, however, there 
are informal channels through which information leaks out of a series of silos. Yet 
these informal channels are inevitably less effective than if there were formal 
horizontal and bottom-up channels. .  
New tools for managing service delivery for patients, such as quality and safety 
controls, are based on more complex and decentralised modes of governing. Yet they 
were introduced top-down within a hierarchical system of hospital governance without 
the necessary structural reforms in leadership.5 Thus, new modes of control created 
gaps in a hitherto strongly hierarchical and centralised governance structure of 
hospitals. 
Finally, our study identified some convergence in relation to the policy tools, while 
implementation is strongly shaped by the institutional contexts of the healthcare 
system, and therefore produces distinct outcomes. The findings highlight the benefits 
of including the Russian Federation in comparative research and call for greater 
attention to the situation in transformation countries. 
Limitations of the study 
This study is explorative and based on purposive sampling of the hospital cases and 
on key informants. The selected cases include variety of hospital types and regions 
and there are no signs of a systematic bias in our selection, yet representative data 
are not available. Furthermore, this research aimed to identify gaps in governance 
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structures, which may reveal policy problems and, in turn, potential levers for 
change. However, the study cannot present solutions for these problems and does 
not identify ‘best practices’. This would, firstly, need comprehensive micro-level data 
and in-depth analysis of processes and actions, and secondly, a very much larger 
number of case studies in order to understand the beliefs and motivations of various 
groups of actors in different types of hospitals, with sufficient data to compare 
developments between hospitals and the 85 regions of the Russian Federation. 
Although in-depth research is certainly desirable, it is especially challenging in a 
country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation.  
 
Conclusions  
The model of hospital management in the Russian Federation faces three major 
problems. First, they exhibit a leaky system of coordination with lack of structures for 
horizontal exchange of information within the hospitals (meso-level). As a 
consequence, the transformative ability of new management tools may be ‘neutralised’ 
as ideas flow down (and more rarely up) through a hierarchical system of hospital 
governance where control lies in the hands of one person, the chief physician.  
Second, there is an implementation gap in the system of hospital governance. New 
legal requirements and control mechanisms create new or reinforce existing structural 
inequalities between the three types of hospitals to the disadvantage of the rayon 
hospitals. The control mechanisms are poorest precisely in those hospitals which are 
less well-resourced. Thus, the introduction of new ways of managing hospitals are 
likely to be taken up preferentially by those with the greatest resources, thereby 
reinforcing existing inequalities in service provision.  
Third, there is little evidence of a learning culture, whereby problems can be identified, 
solutions discussed and identified, lessons learned, and new ways of doing things 
disseminated. As a consequence, there is a risk that the same mistakes could be made 
repeatedly.  
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Box 1 Glossary 
Oblast – The 85 main territorial divisions of the Russian Federation, each with their 
own executive authority (usually a governor or a head), legislative body (regional 
parliaments) and judiciary. Consistent with common practice, in this paper the term is 
used to cover all these 85 territories, most of which are termed “oblast” but also include 
republics, krays, and federal cities, each with minor differences in governance 
arrangements.  
Rayon – the territorial unit below the level of the oblast. 
Therapeutist – specialist in internal diseases working in primary care. These are not 
equivalent to a general practitioner as they have little expertise outside internal 
medicine. General practitioners do exist in the Russian Federation but are 
concentrated in a few regions and mainly in rural areas. 
 
Funding sources  
The study was undertaken as part of the International Project on Cardiovascular 
Disease in Russia (IPCDR) funded by the Wellcome Trust Strategic Award 
[100217/Z/12/A], Norwegian Institute of Public Health, UiT The Arctic University of 
Norway, and the Norwegian Ministry of Health. It was conducted within the framework 
of the Basic Research Programme of the National Research University Higher School 
of Economics. 
 
Conflict of interest statement 
Declarations of interest: none 
 
Acknowledgements  
We are very grateful to the key informants for sharing their knowledge and supporting 
this research. The assessment tool has been developed by Working Group 2 ‘Control’ 
of FP7 Cost action IS0903 on Medicine and Management 
(http://www.cost.eu/COST_Actions/isch/IS0903). The authors are grateful to Svetlana 
Sazhina for assistance in the translation of the findings from Russian to English, to 
Natalia Kachalkina for assistance in organisation of the team workshops, and to 
Professor David Leon and Anastasiya Kichigina for comments on an earlier draft.  
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
23 
 
References 
1. Greer S, Wismar M, Kosinska M. Towards intersectoral governance: lessons learned from 
health system governance. Public Health Panorama 2015;1(2):111–204. 
2. Greer SL, Wismar M, Figueras J, McKee C. Governance: a framework. In: Greer SL, Wismar M, 
J. F, eds. Strengthening health system governance: better policies, stronger performance. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press; 2016: p. 27–56. 
3. Jeurissen P, Duran A, Saltman RB. Uncomfortable realities: the challenge of creating real 
change in Europe’s consolidating hospital sector. BMC Health Serv Res 2016;16(2):168. 
4. Burau V, Bro F. The making of local hospital discharge arrangements: specifying the role of 
professional groups. BMC Health Serv Res 2015;15:305. 
5. Denis JL, van Gestel N. Medical doctors in healthcare leadership: theoretical and practical 
challenges. BMC Health Serv Res 2016; 16(Suppl 2):158. 
6. Kirkpatrick I, Hartley K, Kuhlmann E, Veronesi G. Clinical management and professionalism.  
The Palgrave international handbook of healthcare policy and governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave; 
2015, p. 325–40. 
7. Kirkpatrick I, Kuhlmann E, Hartley K, Dent M, Lega F. Medicine and management in European 
hospitals: a comparative overview. BMC Health Serv Res 2016; 16(Suppl 2):171. 
8. Kuhlmann E, von Knorring M. Management and medicine: why we need a new approach to 
the relationship. J Health Serv Res Policy 2014; 19(3):189-91. 
9. Kuhlmann E, Burau V, Correia T, et al. "A manager in the minds of doctors": a comparison of 
new modes of control in European hospitals. BMC Health Serv Res 2013; 13:246. 
10. Taylor N, Clay-Williams R, Hogden E, Braithwaite J, Groene O. High performing hospitals: a 
qualitative systematic review of associated factors and practical strategies for improvement. BMC 
Health Serv Res 2015; 15:244. 
11. Durán A, Saltman RB. Governing public hospitals. In: Kuhlmann E, Blank RB, Bourgeault IL, 
Wendt C, eds. The Palgrave international handbook of healthcare policy and governance. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave; 2015, p. 443–61. 
12. Healy J, McKee M. Implementing hospital reform in central and eastern Europe. Health 
Policy 2002; 61(1):1–19. 
13. McKee M, Healy J, editors. Hospitals in a changing Europe. Maidenhead: Open University 
Press; 2002. 
14. [details witheld for anonymity of submission] 
15. Rotar AM, Botje D, Klazinga NS, et al. The involvement of medical doctors in hospital 
governance and implications for quality management: a quick scan in 19 and an in depth study in 7 
OECD countries. BMC Health Serv Res 2016; 16(Suppl 2):160. 
16. Horton R. Clinical leadership improves health outcomes. Lancet 2013; 382:925. 
17. Plochg T, Arah OA, Botje D, et al. Measuring clinical management by physicians and nurses in 
European hospitals: development and validation of two scales. Int J Qual Health Care 2014; 26(Suppl 
1):56–65. 
18. Botje D, Klazinga NS, Wagner C. To what degree is the governance of Dutch hospitals 
orientated towards quality in care? Does this really affect performance? Health Policy 2013; 113(1-
2):134–41. 
19. Von Knorring M, de Rijk A, Alexanderson K. Managers' perceptions of the manager role in 
relation to physicians: a qualitative interview study of the top managers in Swedish healthcare. BMC 
Health Serv Res 2010; 10:271. 
20. Kuhlmann E, Rangnitt Y, von Knorring M. Medicine and management: looking inside the box 
of changing hospital governance. BMC Health Serv Res 2016; 16(Suppl 2):159. 
21. Burau V, Carstensen K, Lou S, Kuhlmann E. Professional groups driving change toward 
patient-centred care: interprofessional working in stroke rehabilitation in Denmark. BMC Health Serv 
Res 2017; 17(1):662. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
24 
 
22. Larsen KN, Kristensen SR, Sogaard R. Autonomy to health care professionals as a vehicle for 
value-based health care? Results of a quasi-experiment in hospital governance. Soc Sci Med 2018; 
196:37–46. 
23. Popovich L, Potapchik E, Shishkin S, Richardson E, Vacroux A, Mathivet B. Russian 
Federation. Health 2011; 13(7):1–190. 
24. Rechel B, Richardson E, McKee M. Trends in health systems in the former Soviet countries. 
Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; 2014. 
25. Rechel B. Health policy reform in the countries of the former Soviet Union.  The Palgrave 
international handbook of healthcare policy and governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave; 2015, p. 238–
53. 
26. GBD 2015 Healthcare Access and Quality Collaborators. Healthcare Access and Quality Index 
based on mortality from causes amenable to personal health care in 195 countries and territories, 
1990-2015: a novel analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015. Lancet 2017; 
390(10091):231–66. 
27. Kontsevaya A, Sabgaida T, Ivanova A, Leon DA, McKee M. How has the management of acute 
coronary syndrome changed in the Russian Federation during the last 10 years? Health Policy 2017; 
121(12):1274–9. 
28. Glonti K. Specialised and in-patient services. In: Rechel B, Richardson E, McKee M, editors. 
Trends in health systems in the former Soviet Countries. Copenhagen: European Observatory for 
Health Systems and Policies; 2014, p. 129–44.  
29. Glenton C, Lewin S, Norris S, Norris S. Using evidence from qualitative research to develop 
WHO guidelines. Handbook for Guideline Development, 2nd edition. Geneva: World Health 
Organization; 2016. 
30. Wrede S. How country matters: studying health policy in a comparative perspective. The 
SAGE handbook of qualitative methods in health research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; 2010, p. 88–
105. 
31. Russian Federation. Article 90. [Basic law on the health care of citisens of Russian 
Federation]. 21.11.2011 #323-FZ. Moscow; 2011. 
32. Russian Federation. Federal Law No. 64-FZ of June 13, 1996 on the Enforcement of the 
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Adopted by the State Duma on May 24, 1996. Adopted by 
the Federation Council on June 5, 1996. Moscow; 1996. 
33. Preker AS, McKee M, Mitchell A, Wilbulpolprasert S. Strategic management of clinical 
services. In: Jamison DT, Alleyne G, Breman J, et al., editors. Disease control priorities in developing 
countries, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006, p. 1339–52. 
34. Gerry CJ, Sheiman I. Too many and too few: The paradoxical case of physicians in the Russian 
Federation. Int J Health Plann Manage 2017; 33(1):e391–e402. 
35. Romanov P. Quality evaluation in social services: Challenges for new public management in 
Russia. In: Peters G, editor. Mixes, matches, and mistakes: New Public Management in Russia and 
the Former Soviet Republics. Budapest: Open Society Institute, OSI/LGI; 2008, p. 9–53. 
36. Karanikolos M, Kuhlbrandt C, Richardson E. Health workforce. In: Rechel B, Richardson E, 
McKee M, editors. Trends in health systems in the former Soviet countries. Copenhagen: European 
Observatory for Health Systems and Policies; 2014, p. 77–90. 
37. Maeda A, Socha-Dietrich K. Feasibility study on health workforce skills assessment: 
supporting health workers achieve person-centred care. Paris: OECD; 2018; 
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Feasibility-Study-On-Health-Workforce-Skills-Assessment-
Feb2018.pdf. 
38. OECD, editor. Health workforce policies in OECD Countries: right jobs, right kills, right places 
Paris: OECD; 2016. 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
25 
 
Figure 1 Governance structure of hospitals in the Russian Federation 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation  
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
26 
 
Table 1: Numbers of subjects interviewed in each setting 
 
Regional level City level Rayon level 
Total 
Senior Middle Senior Middle Senior Middle 
Nizhny 
Novgorod 
4 20 2 13 2 10 51 
Pskov 3 21 2 15 1 12 54 
Tatarstan 6 24 3 18 2 14 67 
Tyumen 5 20 2 14 1 12 54 
Vladimir 4 20 2 16 2 12 56 
Total 22 105 11 76 8 60 282 
Source: own data 
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Table 2: Selected features of the territories included in this study and for the Russian 
Federation as a whole  
Territory 
 
Population 
(thousand) 
2016 
Gross Regional 
Product (GRP) 
per capita 2016 
(Roubles) 
Rank on GRP 
per capita 
among all 
oblasts 
Life expectancy 
at birth (2016) 
Nizhny Novgorod 
region 
3,254 312  
14 
 
70.8 
Pskov region 642 188  73 69.2 
Tatarstan 
3,877 432  
 
                      6 
73.6 
Tyumen region 3,638 1,432  19 72.3 
Vladimir region 1,393 235  43 70.3 
Russian 
Federation (total) 
146,804  402  
 
71.9 
Source: Rosstat. Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators 2017. Statistical Collection. 
Moscow, 2017.  
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Table 3 Average number of managers in senior and middle management in different  
types of hospitals 
Hospitals  Senior management  Middle management  Average number of beds 
Regional level 13.4 (10-18) 61.2 (36-88) 1267 
City level 12.4 (8-18) 42.6 (12-103) 616 
Rayon level 6.0 (3-11) 19.4 (9-46) 232 
Source: own data 
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